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 Executive Summary 
 
Canada’s security interests and the mission of our Armed Forces – that is to defend Canada, 
defend North America and to promote peace and security abroad – may largely remain 
unchanged and timeless. The nature of the security environment, however, has not – nor will it 
be in the years to come.   
An effective and relevant Canadian Armed Forces will continue to require capable, well-
equipped and operationally-ready maritime, air and land forces who are largely raised and 
trained within our Army, Navy and Air Force. But in order for Defence to remain relevant and 
effective in an era of increased instability, volatility and unpredictability, our Armed Forces need 
the ability and capacity to match these with an increased understanding of what is going on, and 
preparedness for what is to come. This is the business of our military’s Joint Forces – those 
beyond the tactical units that the services provide. It is the joint organizations and networks 
within the institution that generate intelligence, provide understanding and lead the partnering, 
planning, force posturing and practicing so essential to the anticipation of, preparation for, and 
conduct of, operations – in particular in a world of unrelenting complexity.   
A decade after General Rick Hillier’s extraordinary initiatives to transform our Armed Forces 
from a service-centric machine-age force to one focused on the business of operations, one that 
thinks and acts Canadian Forces (joint) first, we do see evidence of real progress in the approach 
to joint operations and improved appreciation of our military’s joint functions and capabilities. 
Unlike the political and public calls for strong services and the modernization of their major 
platforms, however, this progress has been realized largely through efforts internal to the Armed 
Forces themselves. The initiative has been without political leadership and external policy top-
cover, rendering this progress and its future vulnerable and reversible. 
This paper describes the functions of the Joint Force; advocates for the capabilities they require 
to enable partnerships, enhance understanding and advance mission preparedness; and calls for 
unified leadership of the joint domain and over our military’s joint culture. Our traditional 
international partners have travelled this road. They too see that clarity on joint functions, joint 
capability, joint domain leadership, and stewardship over joint culture are vital to their 
military’s relevance and operational effectiveness – and to their agility and flexibility in the 
years to come. Their progress is the result of internal professional transformation, as well as the 
understanding of, and requirement by political leaders and modern defence policy to make this 
so. Here in Canada, the forming of new government this fall calls for a relook at Defence policy, 
providing new opportunity to invite that same political leadership and influence. 
Joint functions, joint capabilities and clear joint leadership are vital to our military’s relevance 
to, and effectiveness in, our national defence and operations. Joint Forces and the joint domain, 
like strong and capable Army, Navy and Air Forces, need to be led, resourced and fully engaged 
before planes fly, ships sail, and troops deploy. Joint-ness requires external understanding and 
proponents, and, within the Forces, a clearly identifiable champion. In Canada, these range from 
ambiguous to absent.  
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hen the Canadian Armed Forces and National Defence make the agenda, it is 
usually a consequence of what is going on and should be done in the face of the 
crises of the day, or over debates on policy for the future. Issues range from 
internal challenges like the Deschamps Report on sexual misconduct, failures 
and underperformance in government programs to procure the major 
equipment and material so essential to the Army, Navy and Air Force, and the real limits in 
government investment affecting the training and operational readiness of our troops, to 
external challenges in national and international security we see playing out globally – most 
recently with the Syrian refugee crisis at the fore.  
There are, as well, calls for Government to step back from the alligators closest to the boat in 
order to look longer term: to update and reframe our understanding of national security 
interests and objectives, to modernize Defence strategy, and to increase the proportion of our 
national wealth invested in our future security and defence.1 We do need to see current 
challenges and future trends through the lens of what else is coming and where we need to get 
to, versus where we are today and what to do next. Canada does need to take a pull to the future 
versus a push from the past approach to our advancing our national security and defence 
interests – and to resourcing and shaping the future of our Canadian Armed Forces 
accordingly.2 
Between these ends of the spectrum of public and political interest and debate, however, lies an 
incredibly important and inadequately championed range of activities and capabilities that the 
public, government and National Defence itself need to understand and advance if we are to 
remain effectively served by the Canadian Armed Forces today, and well defended in the future. 
While the political understanding of and focus on our military is predominantly on its services 
(the Army, Navy and Air Force), it is only by acting as a joint and integrated force (that is with 
functions, capabilities, and leadership inclusive of and beyond those of the services) that the 
Canadian Armed Forces can deliver results today, along with the agility and flexibility to remain 
effective in the future.  
The joint domain and our military’s Joint Forces have enjoyed some attention, resourcing and 
new leadership in the recent past, and real progress within the military profession to act as a 
joint and integrated team of teams has been made. That progress, however, has been due almost 
singularly to efforts internal to the Canadian Armed Forces themselves as they adapt to the 
extraordinary experiences of the last decade and a half, and to initiatives by uniformed 
leadership to promote more joint-ness and integration amongst those who serve. Clear public 
understanding of the Canadian Armed Forces as a joint and integrated team that requires joint 
capability and leadership - and political leadership to drive this understanding into enduring 
joint functions, capability, capacity and behaviour have been, and remain, largely absent.  
                                                          
1 Paul H. Chapman, J.L. Granatstein, Grig. Gen Don McNamara, Hugh Segal: “A Roadmap to a Stronger Military,” 
The National Post, 28 September 2015. 
2 Amongst these is “The Strategic Outlook for Canada 2015,” by Ferry de Kerckhove and the Conference of Defence 
Associations Institute. 
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Public and political interest in events of the day remains important. Calls for national security 
and defence strategy review do need to persist. Advocacy for resources and modern platforms 
for our three services must remain strong. But if the Armed Forces are to continue to modernize 
and advance their effectiveness in the defence of Canada, as well as enabling those who serve to 
serve well, then public understanding and political leadership over our military’s joint functions, 
joint capabilities and joint leadership must be advanced as well.   
This paper is focused on growing advocacy for strategic leadership for the very real Joint3 – that 
is inclusive of and beyond the singular elements of Army, Navy and Air Forces – functions, 
capabilities, resources, leadership and culture required of and for an effective, relevant and 
modern Canadian Armed Forces. Unlike the individual services, understanding of Canadian 
Armed Forces joint functions, capabilities, resource requirements and leadership is elusive. It is 
hard to come by a clear vision that describes the Armed Forces (beyond that written internally) 
as a joint and integrated team. Direction to guide the joint domain is largely absent in policy and 
has no singular champion in the defence program. These factors render the progress that has 
been made reversible, joint capabilities and resources vulnerable, and the cultural journey 
within the Armed Forces themselves tenuous.  
The potential for a future Defence Policy review and formulation of a modern Defence Strategy, 
and the engagement of an increasingly joint-experienced Canadian Armed Forces leadership 
under General Jonathan Vance’s leadership today, offer opportunity to take these on. It is by 
requiring, directing and resourcing the Canadian Armed Forces to be and act as a joint and 
integrated Force that government can realize the full potential and full benefit of its investment 
in Defence, and assure that Canada is well postured and prepared to deal with a volatile and 
unpredictable future.  
Ask a sailor, soldier, or airman what they do for a living and they might reply: “I sail … I drive 
tanks … I fly.” When asked why, answers may vary but speak, at the end of the day, to this 
simply expressed (but demanding) mission: To defend Canada and North America, and to 
promote peace and security abroad.4  Sailing, flying, deploying on the land, all of these are 
essential elements that translate the words of security and defence into action and results. On 
their own, however, they do not and cannot get set conditions for success, nor fully get the job 
done. There are essential joint functions and capabilities – inclusive of and beyond those our 
Army, Navy and Air Force provide – that the Forces need to bring to bear before, during, and 
after any particular operational action in today’s and the future security environment, and 
certainly before ships sail, planes fly, and troops march. Let’s look at the joint functions first.  
                                                          
3 Canadian Forces Joint Publication 01 “Canadian Military Doctrine,” defines Joint as an adjective that connotes 
activities, operations, organizations in which elements of at least two services participate. Time, technology, and 
experience have led to a more organic understanding of joint to mean the integration of service capabilities within a 
joint framework of capabilities that come from within and beyond the services – command and control and 
communications systems, intelligence, surveillance, space, cyber, information operations, and operational support 
and sustainment.   
4 Canadian Armed Forces are assigned three (what have been enduring) missions within “the Canada First Defence 
Strategy” of 2008: Defend Canada – by delivering excellence at home, Defend North America – by being a strong and 
reliable defence partner, Contribute to international peace and security – by projecting leadership abroad. 
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For those who lived it in uniform, the Cold War era was characterized by the acronym “SALY” – 
meaning “same as last year.” SALY perished in the era following the collapse of the Berlin Wall 
and no one expects it to re-emerge anytime soon. From the Russian led and proxy conflict on 
NATO’s eastern flank, to ISIS, to state and non-state cyberwarfare, to the collapse of order in the 
Middle East and North Africa, to proliferation, to the contest over maritime spaces, to the 
competition in control of outer space, to climate change and natural disasters (all of these being 
recent phenomena), we can see that instability and volatility are on the rise. From the former 
Yugoslavia civil war in the 1990s to the emergence of ISIS and Russian aggression today, few, if 
any, of these challenges were anticipated. While the Defence mission has remained largely 
enduring, the nature of the security environment has not. It will remain increasingly challenged 
and unpredictable.5 
Increases in instability, volatility and unpredictability need to be matched by an increased effort 
in understanding what is going on and what is coming, and in enhanced preparedness for 
what may come next. First class and operationally-ready6 forces from the Army, Navy and Air 
Force are included in this preparedness. The real work in understanding and preparedness7 is 
led and performed not by the services themselves, but by the joint and integrated forces (which 
includes significant elements of the services) of the Armed Forces.  
Canada’s security and defence interests are challenged in all domains – at sea, in the air, on the 
land, in space and cyber, and in the information (influence) domain. Understanding what is 
happening, what’s coming, and what is at stake requires that the Forces have the capability and 
capacity to observe, analyse and report in and across all of these domains – with technology-
based and human sensors – and to do this with partners. This is a team effort:  for Government, 
across Ministries and security partners at home, and across military and security force alliances 
and partnerships abroad. Networking, collecting and analyzing information, formulating shared 
understanding horizontally, and integrating that understanding from the national to tactical 
levels is a full-time undertaking for the Joint Force, requiring process, people in the right places 
with the right partners, sensors, technology, and leadership. Understanding the before, during, 
and after conflict and crisis is a key function of and contribution by the Joint Force to 
government, to its partners, and is ultimately vital to those deployed or about to deploy into 
harm’s way. 
The Armed Forces rarely undertake missions by themselves. Domestic operations are in support 
of provincial or federal partners. NORAD is a bi-national partnership for continental defence. 
International peace and security operations range in combinations of alliance, coalition and 
Canadian whole-of-government efforts. Partnerships are essential to the provision of 
                                                          
5 “The Strategic Outlook for Canada 2015,” by Ferry de Kerckhove and the Conference of Defence Associations 
Institute, p. 4 to 7. “The Future Security Environment 2013-2040,” Department of National Defence, Chief of Force 
Development, p. 127. 
6  The Auditor General of Canada defines readiness as: a measure of the ability of a Canadian unit to undertake an 
approved task. Readiness includes several aspects, including personnel, training and equipment. “Report of the 
Standing Committee on National Defence, December 2012”. 
7 Preparedness is not an official term within Canadian Armed Forces lexicon, nor does it enjoy shared understanding 
within and outside of the military. The Article written by Paul Johnston, Chris Madsen, Paul Mitchell, and Steven 
Moritsugu  “A Canadian Approach to the Operational Level of Command,” Canadian Military Journal Volume 14, No. 
4, goes a long way to describing it and offering a platform for its further development and entrenchment in military, 
defence, and broader security sector behaviour. 
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understanding, not just the threat and risk environment, but also the assessment, capabilities 
and intentions of security and defence partners at home and abroad. Partnerships establish – in 
advance of any particular action – conditions for mission success. These include plans, postured 
forces, positioned equipment, materiel and supplies, lines of communication, host nation 
agreements, supply chains, and practicing (exercising in military parlance) these plans together.  
Strategic and operational planning allows partners to anticipate where crisis or contingencies 
may arise, to establish the information exchange agreements and architectures to focus 
understanding, and identify indicators and warnings. It allows partners to inform strategic 
choices about force posturing and operational readiness; to establish in advance provisions for 
host nation over-flight, access, basing and support; and to provision and position supplies and 
secure air, maritime and land lift capacities. Planning allows teams to then practise – testing 
assumptions, confirming posture and readiness choices, validating logistics and supply and the 
full range of operational support. Practicing is essential to creating the person-to-person trust 
and relationships within and beyond the Forces so essential to mission success, and to the agility 
and resilience of partnerships to withstand shocks, exploit opportunities and to persist in the 
face of real challenges.  
Partnering, planning, posturing forces and practicing represent, in essence, mission 
preparedness – a key operational capability in its own right. Understanding and 
preparedness are the business of the Joint Force and Joint Leadership, and require joint 
capabilities with the people, time, equipment, and financial resources to match. Key amongst 
these are the human capacity and communications networks (meaning headquarters) that link 
people across the Forces and its services, and with civilian and international partners; the 
information collection sensors and intelligence networks layered from the national to tactical 
levels - and horizontally across agencies and with trusted international partners; operations in 
space to ensure communications, navigation, earth observation and control of space assets; and 
the preservation of our cyber networks with capacity to deny an adversary theirs. The military 
calls this C4ISR, or “Command, Control, Computers, Communications, Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance.” Responsibility for C4ISR is split between the Vice Chief of 
the Defence Staff, Commander Canadian Joint Operations Command, Assistant Deputy Minister 
Information Management and the Service Chiefs, with only limited coordination. 
Finally is the operational support that prepares in theatre conditions for force deployment, 
reception, integration and mission support from personnel, to finance, to supply, to 
maintenance, to health services, to engineering and force protection – the full gamut of vital 
support functions without which an operationally-engaged force cannot succeed nor survive.  
C4ISR, space and cyber networks, and operational support capacities are all joint force 
responsibilities and joint capabilities – capabilities that are and must be fully engaged before 
operations occur and that are in full demand once committed. These, and the people and 
structures required to operate them, are not overhead.  
A government committed to the effective defence of Canada, and to a relevant, effective and 
agile Armed Forces must necessarily be committed to a modern Joint Force – delivering the full 
suite of joint functions, enabled by the full suite of joint capabilities, and operating under 
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unifying joint leadership. Absent these, strategic understanding of the security environment will 
remain elusive. The range of choices available to government action – and speed and 
effectiveness of response – will be dramatically constrained, and the risks faced by troops 
deployed in harm’s way, much less robustly mitigated.  
In 2005, then Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) General Rick Hillier launched a Canadian Forces 
transformation – seeking to move the Forces from a service-centric, machine age, Cold War 
baseline to one focused on being able to understand, to be capable in, and to be relevant to the 
security and defence challenges of the day, and those to come.8 His transformation principles 
were: to be loyal to Canada and the Canadian Forces first; to operate via command-centred 
decision making; to assign clear responsibilities and authorities for commanders; to act as an 
operationally focused force; to promote leadership emphasizing mission command; and to 
pursue institutional alignment across the forces and with the Department of National Defence. 
Noting a strong bias for a service-based professional foundation, General Hillier stimulated the 
thinking and behaviour of the Canadian Forces to acting as a Joint Force in the first instance. He 
took steps to advance that understanding and to establish its leadership internally within the 
profession. He was incredibly successful in dislodging the profession from a decade and a half of 
post-Cold War inertia and in firing up the imagination and creative leadership of what had been 
a less than united General and Flag Officer cohort. He created the organizational capacity and 
clear authority for the conduct of all operations at home and abroad through the establishment 
of three Operational Commands and Special Operations Forces Command (Joint Commands) – 
and the assurance of their operational support. In addition, he was masterful in connecting 
Canadians with their fellow citizens in uniform.9   
At the beginning of the transformation effort, General Hillier garnered significant enthusiasm 
and enjoyed substantial buy-in from military leaders. However, the methods used to drive 
transformation did eventually lead to an atmosphere of competition (in vision and resources) 
between the Canadian Armed Forces and the bureaucracy, between the services and the new 
Joint Command structures, and even between some of the Service Chiefs and the CDS himself. 10 
The creation of the Operational Commands and the language of transformation did advance 
some joint functions, joint capability, joint leadership and joint culture – but did so absent 
political leadership, written policy, strategy, and resource assurance. General Hillier rightly 
described transformation as a journey and not an end state. However, clarity about the vision 
and direction for the future were left unanswered. Following his departure, the journey to an 
enduring operationally focused, Canadian Forces first, and joint culture was left without a 
clearly identifiable steward.  
In 2011, Lieutenant General Andrew Leslie and the Canadian Forces Transformation Team 
tabled a Report on Canadian Forces Transformation offering forty-three recommendations for 
                                                          
8  Devin Conley and Dr. Eric Ouellet, “The Canadian Forces and Military Transformation – An Elusive Quest for 
Efficiency”, the Canadian Army Journal 14.1. 
9 Philippe Lagasse, “A Mixed Legacy: General Hillier and Canadian Defence, 2005-2008.” Paper presented at the 
Canadian Political Science Association 2009 Conference, Carleton University, 27 May 2009.  
10 ibid., Conley and Ouellet, and Lieutenant-General (ret’d) Michael Jeffery, “Inside Canadian Forces 
Transformation,” Canadian Military Journal 2010, Volume 10, Number 2. 
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consideration for transformation round two.11 Whereas General Hillier’s effort targeted the 
professional understanding and then the transformed operational engagement and effectiveness 
of the Forces (professional hearts and minds as it were) the round two efforts focused on 
resources and efficiency – less transformation and more organizational modernization. 
Successive government-led resource reductions did necessitate a clear look at resources. The 
report, however, provided little that would either challenge or advance General Hillier’s 
transformation principles.  
Nevertheless, one of the report’s recommendations led in 2012 to the integration of command 
over Canadian Armed Forces operations under a singular Commander, within a new Canadian 
Joint Operations Command (CJOC).12 The integration of three operational commands into one, 
and the unification of the defence operational mission – to defend Canada, North America, and 
support peace and security abroad – within that singular command, in particular in 
understanding, partnering and practicing, has had some unifying effect in Canadian Forces 
culture and behaviour, and in key relationships with operational partners.  
Authority for and leadership over the joint force capabilities set: command and control and 
communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, space, cyber, and operational 
support, however, remain ambiguous. A singular Joint Operations Commander exists – but just 
who the joint capability and culture “Bubba” is remains unclear.13 Achieving a Canadian Forces-
first and joint culture is challenged by persistent competition for scarce resources between 
services and the evolving Joint Command and capability effort. Even within Canadian Armed 
Forces leadership and the professional military education system, little has improved in terms of 
identifying leadership and methods to purposefully advance joint culture throughout the Forces. 
While pieces of the joint agenda have advanced, joint-ness and leadership over the joint domain 
have yet to become firmly entrenched – within and beyond the military profession.  
It took a failure in Vietnam and an act of Congress to compel the long road to lasting joint 
culture, capability and behaviour within the United States (US) military. Twenty-nine years after 
the Goldwater-Nichols Act, unified and geographic joint commands persist. Their 
responsibilities, functions and capabilities to assure understanding, persistent partnering and 
mission preparedness – as well as the assurance of joint and integrated action in operations - is 
entrenched. The organizational and cultural journey to this end was long and is not necessarily 
over, but it remains embedded and well-led politically, in policy, and within the US military 
profession itself.14 
Closer in size and structure to the Canadian experience, the United Kingdom (UK) Armed 
Forces responded to lessons from the Falklands war and the demands of the Balkan crises by 
establishing a Joint Operational Commander and the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) in 
the mid-1990s.15 While this unified the command of operations, it was only in 2012, based on 
                                                          
11 Martin Shadwick, “The Report on Transformation 2011,” The Canadian Military Journal 2011, Volume 10, No. 1. 
12 National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces Backgrounder on Canadian Forces Transformation: New 
Operational Command and Control Structure, May 11, 2012. 
13  Johnston, Madsen, Mithchell, Moritsugu, “A Canadian Approach to the Operational Level of Command”. 
14 James R Locher III, “Has it Worked – the Goldwater Nichols Reform Act?,” Naval War College Review, 2001, Vol 
LIV, No. 4. 
15 PJHQ  History, http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk. 
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the political direction resulting from the 2011 Levene Report on Defence Reform, that the UK 
established Joint Forces Command – which includes the Permanent Joint Headquarters – to 
lead and oversee the entirety of the Joint Force policy, doctrine, professional education, 
training, structure, capabilities and operations for the British military. The report wrote that: 
“We do not, however, believe that clarification in this way (the role of the services in supporting 
joint efforts) will be enough. The future character of conflict will increase yet further the demand 
for integrated capability and joint enablers. There is evidence that joint enabling capabilities do 
not receive the priority they merit in the single service force structure. We therefore believe 
there is a strong case for developing a Joint Forces Command (JFC) to deliver output focussed 
capabilities and capitalise on potential synergies to deliver enhanced joint operational effect.”16 
Even during a period of substantial resource reduction since 2010, the UK has invested in joint 
functions, capability, structure and leadership to drive integration and joint behaviour across 
the Force, indeed advancing under a clearly identified and empowered joint leader, an enhanced 
joint culture. 
Australia split the middle with the establishment of Australian Defence Force Joint Operations 
Command (AUS JOC) in 2004 and by appointing a three-star commander in 2008. Commander 
AUS JOC leads all Australian operations, has the authority to direct preparedness functions, and 
is partnered with the office of the Vice Chief of the Defence Force to ensure the informed 
guidance, design and ultimate provision of joint capabilities to the Force.17 As in the US, UK, and 
Canada, services continue to lead in the development and generation of their tactical forces and 
capabilities, and they do provide significant command and control, intelligence, and operational 
support capacities to this commander. Responsibilities for mission preparedness, the conduct of 
operations, and delivery of operational support are his. This joint operations capability and 
cultural reform effort was founded, like those in the US and UK, on significant political 
engagement, clarity in defence policy, and resource backed strategy. 
Notwithstanding their differences, all three of these familiar partners observed that strong 
services remained essential to Defence, but that these on their own were unable to achieve real 
effectiveness in the defence mission – nationally to the tactical levels – on their own. They 
recognized that where functions could and should be common, service-centred solutions 
introduced inefficiencies and reduced effectiveness of the overall Force. Mandated politically, 
directed in strategy, programmed in structure and resources, and led comprehensively through 
clarity in command, education, assignment and experience - their journey towards joint-ness 
still was still challenging, and hard work remains for these militaries (as it does within the 
Canadian Armed Forces). 
Our Armed Force’s organic efforts to advance operational understanding, to nurture the 
partnering, planning, posturing and practicing functions of mission preparedness, and to 
reinforce joint capability, leadership and culture, have delivered some real progress. This 
progress, however, isn’t sufficient to fully meet the demands of today, nor the challenges to 
come. Neither is it founded and grounded in government-led policy, strategy, or the program 
                                                          
16 The Levene Report on Defence Reform - an independent report into the structure and management of the Ministry 
of Defence, June 2011, p. 45. 
17 ADF command – general, http://nautilus.org/publications/books/australian-forces-abroad/security-general/adf-
command-general/. 
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that apportions resources – and is, consequently, reversible. Nor is progress within Canadian 
Armed Forces joint culture necessarily enduring if, within the force, the question of who is really 
in charge (shy of the CDS him/herself) continues to be debated. 
Government has expended significant effort to rebrand the Canadian Armed Forces as the sum 
of its key parts, our justifiably well-recognized services: the Army, Navy and Air Force. Whether 
seen as celebrating and perpetuating our military’s heritage or returning to the past, this 
rebranding does nothing to advance the joint agenda, nor advance political and public 
understanding that Canada’s men and women in uniform are Canada’s Armed Forces first – 
proud to serve in their Services – but ultimately capable of success in their mission by virtue of 
being a joint and integrated team of teams that live within a joint and integrated Armed Forces. 
Declarations of pride in the men and women of the Army, Navy, Air Forces and Special Forces in 
operations are welcome, but fail to acknowledge the vital work of the Joint Force – and the some 
20,000 members of the Forces who are not serving within environmental commands.  
Internally to the Canadian Armed Forces – leadership over advancing the mission preparedness 
agenda, and the sum of joint operations, joint capability, and joint culture is left in the hands of 
the CDS alone. With all the other responsibilities and demands on his/her plate – it is clear that 
some essential elements of this joint agenda will continue to wait before they become fully 
addressed. 
Effectiveness in defending Canada is assured before crises occur, through enhanced 
understanding, effective partnerships and the mission preparedness activities that enable 
planning, posturing and practicing with those partners. Command and control systems, 
intelligence and surveillance networks, space and cyber as unique operational domains, and the 
full gamut of operational support capabilities are the joint capabilities that enable this 
understanding, partnering, and opportunity to practice, replicating as much as possible the 
conditions that need to be set and that our troops would see in an actual operation. Mission 
preparedness provides invaluable understanding to government and partners, and assures the 
Forces ability to get to, endure, survive, and succeed in operations.  
It is clear who within the Canadian Armed Forces leads in the development and generation of 
land, maritime and air operational capabilities – but it is less clear who is the ultimate authority 
over these same things in the joint domain. Policy, Strategy, and the Defence Program are long 
in targeting the sustainment and development of a strong Army, Navy and Air Force. Policy, 
Strategy and Program – and organizational practice and behaviour – are less explicit and clear 
about these in the vital Joint Operations Functions, Capabilities, and leadership that Canada 
requires. Canadian Armed Forces leadership over the joint elements of their institution and in 
driving forward a professional joint culture remains ambiguous.  
As a new Government embarks on its mandate and turns to a strategic look at defence strategy, 
procurement, as well as dealing with the crises of the day, there exists a new opportunity to take 
stock of and entrench the tenets of mission preparedness, to encode preparedness functions in 
policy and strategy, to relook the joint capability investment and oversight in the Defence 
Program, and to identify clear military leadership over the joint agenda – including our own 
military’s joint culture. Political enthusiasm for strong services is needed, and a commitment to 
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recapitalizing their major capabilities is absolutely essential. We need the same for the Joint 
Force and the joint domain.  
Organic efforts within the Canadian Armed Forces have had varying degrees of success in 
advancing the ball down the field. As our more familiar partners have witnessed through their 
own experiences, it takes political understanding and leadership, the requirement by policy, the 
assurance of capability through program and strategy, and clarity in professional leadership to 
progress, and to sustain that progress. Today’s cohort of strategic military leaders gets this, and 
is assuredly well placed to offer their professional advice on how to get there.  
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